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A THEORY OF THE CHARTER*

BY BRIAN

SLATERY**

A constitution is the way of life of a citizen-body.

-Aristotle

Canadian legal thought has at many points in the past deferred to that of the
British; the Charterwill be no sign of our national maturity if it simply becomes an
excuse for adopting another intellectual mentor.
-Justice La Forest2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Does the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms3 elevate
judges to a dominant position in the Canadian Constitution? Many
commentators on the Charter seem to think so. Some of them,
moreover, hold that this is an unfortunate and undemocratic turn of
events, while others applaud the move. Since the Chartercame into
force, there has been persistent debate over the role of the judiciary
in applying its terms. What is interesting about this debate is that
it assumes that the Canadian Charter is basically similar to the
American Bill of Rights and that the American experience is crucial
to understanding the position here.4 I think that this assumption is
wrong and the *debate is misguided. Dazzled by the powerful
headlights of American constitutional doctrine, we are drawn onto
highways running from places we have never been to places we may
not want to go.
The Charter is strikingly different from the American Bill of
Rights. And it is different, not only in the range and character of
the rights it protects, but in crucial structural ways. The most
notable difference is that section 33 of the Charter allows
legislatures to enact "notwithstanding clauses" that shield statutes
5
from judicial scrutiny for conformity with many Charter provisions.
One would have thought that this provision would figure
prominently in any debate about the relative roles of legislatures and
courts under the Charter. But curiously this has not been the case.
Section 33 is usually ignored or treated as an embarrassment. The
reason, it appears, is that it does not "fit" the terms of reference
supplied by American constitutional theory. Deprived of guidance
3 Part I of the ConstitutionAct 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
4 See, for example, the discussion of section 7 of the Charter in P. J. Monahan and A.
Petter, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct L. Rev.
69 at 78-95.
5 For detailed discussion of this section, see text below at footnotes 60-66.
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from south of the border, we seem at a loss what to make of the
provision.
Section 33 is perhaps the most fundamental distinguishing
feature of the Canadian Charter. But it is not the only one. In
section 1, the Charter allows for the imposition of reasonable limits
on Charter rights, a feature notably absent from the American Bill
of Rights. Although there has been a lot of discussion regarding the
kind of limits this clause permits and how a court should go about
determining them, there has been scarcely any recognition of the
possibility that the provision allows for significant dialogue between
the courts and legislatures over the reasonableness of limits. This
potential for a democratic and flexible application of the Charterhas
been overlooked, once again apparently because it contradicts basic
6
assumptions of American constitutional theory.
Other important differences between the Charter and the
American Bill of Rights might be pointed out. But my aim here is
not to compare the two documents; it is to open up the discussion
of the Canadian Charter in a way that frees us from the dominance
of American theory. 7 I will explore a mode of thinking about the
Charter'sbasic structure that departs from the one tacitly informing
most current thinking about the Charter, but which I think is more
faithful to the text and spirit of the document and, of equal
importance, to our constitutional heritage. Ultimately any theory of
the Charter should be judged, not by its conformity to some preexisting model, whether this be the American Bill of Rights or the

6 The section is considered at greater length below, in the text accompanying footnotes
46-59.
7 I am following here the lead of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Section 94(2) of
the Motor Vehicle Act (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 (S.C.C.), where Lamer J. wrote at 545-46

with reference to an argument presented concerning the scope of section 7 of the Charter.
It imports into the Canadian context American concepts, terminology and
jurisprudence, all of which are inextricably linked to problems concerning the nature
and legitimacy of adjudication under the United States Constitution. That
Constitution, it must be remembered, has no s. 52 nor has it the internal checks and
balances of ss. 1 and 33. We would, in my view, do our own Constitution a
disservice to simply allow the American debate to define the issue for us, all the
while ignoring the truly fundamental structural differences between the two

Constitutions.
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European Convention on Human Rights, but by its ability to display
the Charter as the development and extension of the best of
Canadian constitutional traditions.
II. TWO MODELS OF THE CHARTER
The dominant school of thought on the Charter is presented
with characteristic clarity by Peter Hogg in a passage from his
ConstitutionalLaw of Canada:
The Charterof Rights, like any other bill of rights, guarantees a set of civil liberties

that are regarded as so important that they should receive immunity, or at least
special protection, from state action. This purpose is accomplished through the
courts. If a law (or a governmental act) is challenged, and if it is found by a court
to violate one of the civil liberties guaranteed by the Charter, the court will declare

the law (or act) to be nugatory. In that way, the guaranteed civil liberties are
protected from the actions of Parliament, Legislatures, government agencies and
officials.8

This school, then, portrays the Charter as empowering the
courts to review governmental acts for unjustified violations of basic
rights and to supply remedies to aggrieved parties. The tacit
assumption is that the roles of governments and legislatures under
the Charter remain basically the same as in the pre-Charterera: to
make laws and implement them. The judiciary is thus like a
gardener bringing order to an overgrown garden, or a day-care
worker tending a bunch of lively pre-schoolers. Governments and
legislatures are equivalent to forces of nature, working sometimes
for good and sometimes for ill, but at any rate driven by factors
alien to those animating the Charter. It is not for these bodies to
apply the Charter to themselves, for they are not well-equipped to9
do so. The Charter is for judges, not politicians and civil servants.

8 P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell Company, 1985)
at 651, footnote omitted, emphasis added.

9 This view permeates the writings of most Chartercommentators, of all political stripes.
Thus, such detractors of the Charter as Monahan and Petter write, supra, note 4 at 84-85:
"...the language of the Charter is so broad and amorphous that it leaves for judicial

determination not only the precise nature and scope of certain Charter rights, but whether
those rights exist at all" (emphasis added).
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Upon examination, this viewpoint can be seen to involve
three related propositions. The first of these holds that the
Charter's main effect on governmental bodies is to limit their
powers, so that acts in excess of these limits are invalid. That is,
the Charter does not impose duties on government; it creates
disabilities. It does not generally oblige governmental bodies to act
in any particular way; it merely states conditions under which
governmental action will be valid and effective. The second
proposition holds that the Charter's purposes are achieved through
the courts, which are authorized to strike down governmental acts
that violate the Charter. So, the courts have an exclusive and final
say on the interpretation of Charterprovisions and their application
to governmental acts. The final proposition affirms that the judicial
function is confined to reviewing governmental acts; it does not
extend to rewriting the terms of statutes or to revamping the
common law governing private relations.
Not every adherent to this viewpoint subscribes to all three
propositions.1" But, taken together, they represent a model of the
Charter which has gained widespread acceptance, both in the legal
community and among the general public. I will call this view the
Judicial Model, because of the central role it assigns to the courts.
The Judicial Model is supported not only by popular
conceptions of the American Bill of Rights,11 but also by certain
strands of positivist legal theory, represented most strikingly by
H.L.A. Hart's influential Concept of Law.12 Hart's analysis suggests
that modern Anglo-American constitutions can be understood
without reference to the notion of constitutional duty, which is
relegated to a peripheral and unessential role. This theme, which
recurs at many points throughout the work, is stated briefly as
follows:

10 Peter Hogg, for example, does not fully subscribe to the last proposition, holding that,

under the Charter, courts may in some instances reform the common law governing private
relations; see discussion in ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, supra, note 8 at 672-78.
11 It may be pointed out that the American position on these matters is arguably more
modulated than these ideas acknowledge.
12 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), passim, but esp. at 26-41, 64-69.
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A constitution which effectively restricts the legislative powers of the supreme

legislature in the system does not do so by imposing (or at any rate need not
impose) duties on the legislature not to attempt to legislate in certain ways; instead
it provides that any such purported legislation shall be void. It imposes not legal
duties but legal disabilities.
"Limits' here implies not the presence of dty but the
13
absence of legal power.

This denial of the importance of constitutional duty lies at
the heart of the Judicial Model of the Charter. It is also the source
of much mischief. For despite its initial plausibility, the Judicial
Model is, I think, seriously misleading. In concentrating on the
review functions of courts under the Charter, it gives a partial and
distorted account of the document, which leads to consequences that
we would all, in the end, recognize as erroneous.
This is not the place to trace in detail the similarities
between the Judicial Model and Hart's legal theory or to provide a
critique of the positivist portrayal of constitutional law. My goal
rather is to construct an alternate model of the Charter that better
captures the multi-faceted nature of the document. Interestingly,
this model has found its strongest support to date, not in academic
commentaries on the Charter, but in the opinions of the Supreme
Court of Canada.1 4 Nevertheless the model is found there only in
a fragmented and inchoate form; it has yet to be fully articulated,
much less accepted.
This alternate model holds that the Charter sets up a
complex scheme of constitutional duties and review powers that are
distributed among governments, legislatures, and the courts. These
bodies are equally mandated to pursue the Charter's goals, which
ultimately represent aspects of the common good of the community

13 Ibid at 68 (emphasis in original).
14 For an outstanding early exception, see P.H. Russell, 'The Political Purposes of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1983) 61 C.B.R. 30 esp. at 44-49.
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as a whole 1 5 Like physicians tending to the health of a community,
they work from a shared body of knowledge and traditions and are
committed to a broadly similar set of goals. Yet they differ
somewhat in their particular aptitudes, experience, and expertise, and
sometimes also in their assessment of what ails members of the
community and the proper course of treatment. Citizens dissatisfied
with treatment received from one body may seek a second opinion,
and the body rendering that opinion may take into account the
credentials of the first. Although the various bodies may at times be
at odds with one another, they more usually work in a coordinated
way, for only thus are they able to achieve the broader goals they
all share. Each body recognizes that it would be unable to minister
alone to the needs of the entire community and that the pool of
wisdom present in the group as a whole is far greater than that held
by any single member. This model of the Charter, then, lays stress
on the equal responsibilities of the various branches of government
to carry out the Charter's mandate and the reciprocal nature of their
roles. I will call it the Coordinate Model.
An important feature of the Coordinate Model is the
distinction it draws between first-order and second-order functions
under the Charter. On this view, the Charter has two sorts of
binding effects. First, it directly obliges a range of governmental
bodies to act (or refrain from acting) in certain ways. Specifically,
it obliges them to assess the reasonableness of their own anticipated
acts in light of fundamental rights and to act accordingly. This may
be called a first-order function. The Charter also authorizes and
binds certain bodies to review the acts of others for conformity with
Charterrights where the latter are bound in a first-order way to take
account of the Charterin acting. This may be called a second-order

15

As Dickson CJ.C. observes in R.v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 at 225 (S.C.C.):

'The underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a limit
on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably

justified." For a stimulating presentation of human rights as aspects of the common good, see
John Finnis, NaturalLaw and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) esp. at 210-18.
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function because it involves making judgments over the shoulder of
another, usually after the fact.16
The Charter imposes first-order duties on .three sorts of
governmental bodies: the executive, the legislature, and the courts.
Each of these branches of government has the constitutional duty to
comply with the Charter,regardless of whether any other body can
enforce this obligation. This proposition is implicit in section 32(1)
of the Charter, which states that the Charter applies to the
Parliament and government of Canada and to the legislatures and
governments of the Provinces in respect of all matters within their
respective spheres. Although the section does not specifically
mention the courts, there can be no doubt that they are bound by
the Charter as part of their general duty to apply the law.17 The
point emphasized by the Coordinate Model, however, is that it is
not only the courts that are bound in a first-order way by the
Charter, but the executive and legislative branches as well.
The Coordinate Model maintains that the Charter can fulfil
its proper role only to the extent that the bodies bound in a firstorder way accept the mandate to carry out its guarantees. As Marc
Gold has observed, "the main objective of a Charter of Rights is to
provide a legal framework within which government will act justly in
pursuit of the common good. 18 On this view, the role of review
bodies, while significant, is secondary. By way of analogy, the rules
of a game such as hockey are directed not only at the referees, but
more importantly at the players. Obviously, if the game is to be

16 1 say "usually" because there is the possibility of a court being asked, on a reference,
about the constitutionality ofproposed legislation. In light of arguments developed below, such
reference cases deprive a court of an important ingredient in its decision, namely the
judgement of the body holding first-order duties under the Charter, and should perhaps be
discouraged.
17 In R v. Rahey, supra, note 2 at 633, La Forest J. observes: "... it seems obvious to me
that the courts, as custodians of the principles enshrined in the Charter,must themselves be
subject to Charter scrutiny in the administration of their duties." See also Retail, Wholesale
and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174
(S.C.C.), where McIntyre J. states at 196: "The courts are, of course, bound by the Charter
as they are bound by all law."
18 M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982)
4 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 131 at 155.
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played at all, the players must internally adhere to the rules and
guide their behaviour by reference to it. No doubt the referees
have ultimate say as to what the rules require and whether they
have been followed by the players. But this does not mean that the
referees alone, and not the players, are bound by the rules. For the
game consists of what the players do, and what they do makes sense
only if it is guided by an adherence to norms accepted as common
standards for all those playing the game. And indeed we know that
games can be played successfully
without referees. But they cannot
19
be played with only referees.
The Coordinate Model argues, then, that the proper
functioning of the Charter depends less on the activities of those
responsible for policing others than on the activities of those bound
in a first-order way by its provisions. This does not mean that
second-order functions are unimportant. But it does mean that
second-order bodies acting alone are incapable of ensuring that the
values implicit in the Charterguarantees are properly carried out in
Canadian society. As Jim MacPherson has observed in another
context:
In reality a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada is only one statement in a
continuous conversation among citizens, governments, and the Court. Citizens
speak, governments respond, and the Court evaluates. But the Court's evaluation
is not the final word.
It invites a further response, either approval or
condemnation, from citizens or governments. And if that further resnonse is
condemnation, there are tools available for altering the Court's position.-(

The point being made here does not simply concern the
relative importance of legislatures and courts. For, as we will see
in more detail later, the Coordinate Model argues that both first and
second-order duties are distributed among the various branches of
government. Thus the judiciary has important first-order functions
under the Charter,along with the legislative and executive branches.

19 The example is adapted from one used in another context by H.L.A. Hart in The
Concept of Law, supra, note 12 at 55-56, 138-41. However, as just noted, the Coordinate
Model of constitutional law is quite different from that implied in Hart's work.
20 J.C. MacPherson, "Ihe Potential Implications of Constitutional Reform for the
Supreme Court of Canada" in S.M. Beck & I. Bernier eds, Canadaand the New Constitution:
The UnfinishedAgenda, Vol. 1 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983) 161
at 177.
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And the judiciary is not the only institution with second-order review
functions. Legislatures have the power to scrutinize court decisions
and executive acts for Charter compliance and to enact corrective
statutes, and such statutes can be shielded from judicial review by
notwithstanding clauses under section 33.
Generally the Coordinate Model holds that the Charter
allows for a continuing dialogue between the courts and legislatures
as to the true nature of Charter rights and the reasonableness of
limits on them. But this dialogue can occur only if it is accepted
that the roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
under the Charter are reciprocal and not confrontational and that
their attitudes to1 one another should be flexible and founded on
2
mutual respect.
The Coordinate Model recognizes, of course, that the same
body may have both first and second-order functions under the
Charter. Courts are clearly in this position, for the Charter directly
binds them to act in certain ways and also to review the acts of
others. Moreover both sorts of functions may merge in a single act.
Take the example of a court required to apply a statute authorizing
capital punishment and so doing to determine whether it violates the
Charter guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. 22 Here
the court has to assess the validity of its own prospective act (the
imposition of a sentence) and at the same time the validity of the
statute passed by Parliament. More generally it can be argued that
whenever a body exercises a second-order function under the
Charter, it also exercises a first-order one. Thus where a court
reviews a statute for conformity with the Charter, it is itself bound
to observe the terms of the Charter in making its assessment. In
effect the court has a first-order duty to exercise a second-order
power of review.
The Coordinate Model also maintains that a body may hold
first-order obligations under the Charter even where there is no
other body capable of reviewing its acts. In other words, the
21 See further D. Mullan, "Judicial Deference to Administrative Decision-Making in tile
Age of the Charter" (1985-86) 50 Sask. L. Rev. 203 at 219-20; Justice D.G. Blair, 'qhe

Charter and the Judges: A View from the Bench" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 445 at 446-47.
22 Section 12.
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existence of first-order duties does not depend on the existence of
second-order ones, just as the existence of second-order duties does
not depend on the existence of third-order ones. Otherwise we are
lead down an endless staircase in search of an ever-retreating
foundation. Either we accept that constitutional duties may exist
even where no further level of scrutiny exists, or we deny the
existence of such duties altogether.
The point may be illustrated by an example drawn from a
non-Chartercontext. Consider the position of a court called upon
to apply the terms of a statute to a civil dispute where no appeal
lies from the court's judgment to a higher court, as is the case with
the Supreme Court of Canada. If the statute actually applies to the
dispute, we would say that the court has a first-order duty to apply
it. But it could be objected that, since no other body can review
the court's decision, the court may in fact do as it pleases and that
it is simple mystification to say that it has a duty to apply the
statute. This viewpoint, however, does not correspond to our shared
notions of how judges ought to behave or to the ideas of judges
themselves; and standard judicial oaths to uphold the law reflect this
fact. It seems truer to our understanding of constitutional practice
to say that the court has a first-order duty to apply the statute, even
in the absence of a second-order power in another body to review
its acts.23 In the same way (argues the Coordinate Model), courts,
legislatures, and governments have first-order duties to apply the
Charter in pursuing their accustomed roles even though sometimes
there may be no other bodies with the authority to supervise their
decisions. The significance of this point will be become apparent
later.
We have identified, then, two contrasting models of the
Charter. But, you may ask, does it really make much difference in
23 This view, in fact, is the basis of the famous holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), where Chief Justice Marshall said at 177-78:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on
the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution ... the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence of judicial duty.
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practice which model we adopt? True, the Coordinate Model offers
a more complete understanding of the Charter at the theoretical
level, but when it comes to the Charter's concrete application does
it matter? The rest of this paper represents an attempt to show
that it does indeed matter, that our answers to some of the most
important questions about the Charter's operation are influenced by
the model we adopt. The fundamental reason for this can be stated
briefly.
At first sight, the two models may seem like rival ways of
describing or explaining the Charter. In fact, they are not just
descriptive or explanatory, or even primarily so. In setting out the
roles played by various constitutional bodies, they effectively specify
what these bodies ought and ought not to be doing. They thus have
the potential, if accepted, to influence the actions of the
constitutional actors themselves. To adopt one model over another
is not simply a matter of determining which one better "fits the
facts"; it is a matter of determining what the facts will eventually be.
For regardless whether we view the Constitution on the Judicial or
Coordinate Model, we as citizens make up the entity being described
and have the capacity to determine its basic character.
This, however, is just a preliminary answer, to be elaborated
as we proceed. First, we will examine more closely the major point
activating the Coordinate Model - the insistence that first-order
duties are central to a proper understanding of the Charter. We
will then review relations between first-order and second-order
actors, dealing specifically with sections 1 and 33 of the Charter. I
should remind the reader that my analysis does not necessarily
reflect the current state of jurisprudence on the Charter. The aim
is to articulate a better framework for understanding the Charter
than the one now available.
III. FIRST-ORDER DUTIES
As just seen, the Coordinate Model holds that the Charter
does not simply mandate courts to review the acts of other branches
of government for violations of basic rights: more importantly, it
provides a constitutional code of behaviour directly regulating
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governmental activities as a. whole. 24
What does this mean in
practice? Here I will draw out some of the main implications of
this view, dealing first with the executive and legislative branches,
and then with courts and administrative tribunals. What follows
takes the form of a sketch-map , which suggests in a few strokes the
shape of a country still barely explored. Like early maps of
America, it may display geographical features that later prove
speculative or misplaced, and the map's overall dimensions may be
somewhat off. But, as with America, this does not mean that the
continent itself is a myth.
A. The Executive and Legislative Branches
The Coordinate Model holds that the duty to observe
Charter standards affects every aspect of the process by which laws
are enacted and implemented, including the formation of the initial
policy, the drafting of the detailed provisions of a bill, the debates
in the legislature and legislative committees, the voting of individual
members of the legislature, the drafting of statutory orders and
regulations, and the exercise of any powers conferred by the statute
or its regulations. In principle, every person or body involved in this
process has the responsibility to advert to Charter standards in
making decisions that fall within that person's competence. In
practice, of course, the nature and extent of the responsibility will
vary considerably, depending on the character of the function
exercised and the capacities and resources of the person or body
exercising it. As will be explained at greater length below, there is
more than one way to implement Charter standards; it would be
wrong to assume that the judicial mode is the only one or the best.

24 This view accords with the general position adopted by the Supreme Court in Re

LanguageRights under the ManitobaAc4 1870 (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 19 (S.C.C.), where
it affirms: 'The constitution of a country is a statement of the will of the people to be

governed in accordance with certain principles held as fundamental..." (emphasis added). The
Court holds that section 23 of the Manitoba Ac, 1870 "...establishes a constitutionalduty on

the Manitoba Legislature with respect to the manner and form of enactment of its legislation.
This duty protects the substantive rights of all Manitobans to equal access to the law in either
the French or the English language" Tbid., emphasis added. It goes on to say: 'The judiciary

is the institution charged with the duty of ensuring that the government complies with the
Constitution."
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Since the government of the day normally initiates and drafts
legislation and oversees its passage through Parliament, it carries the
main responsibility of ensuring that the legislation does not intrude
unduly on Charterrights 2 5 This point has so often been overlooked
by commentators mesmerized by judicial review that it deserves
particular emphasis. In the ordinary case, bills introduced by a
majority government pass into law without major amendments. So
a governmental decision that a bill can be justified under the Charter
will temporarily carry the day and, unless later challenged
successfully in court, will have permanent effects on the rights of
ordinary Canadians. Only a selection of laws can ever be effectively
subjected to judicial review, which, in any case, is a lengthy and
expensive process. Courts have only a limited capacity to assess the
correctness of governmental decisions on crucial aspects of public
policy and so (quite properly in many instances) may feel
constrained to defer to the wisdom of the government on these
points. It follows that for a government to adopt the attitude of
"pass now, justify in court later" would not only be an abdication of
its Charter responsibilities, but in fact would undermine the
foundations of judicial respect for the decisions of coordinate
branches of government.
What holds true of the executive also applies to legislatures.
As already pointed out, the power of a legislature to alter a bill
introduced by a majority government is limited in a modern
parliamentary system. This fact does not release members of
parliament from their constitutional duty to scrutinize bills for
possible violations of Charter standards. To carry out the duty
properly, it may be necessary to establish a special committee with
the mandate to consider how proposed legislation may affect basic
rights and to propose suitable amendments.
The observations made above with respect to statutes apply
with equal force to statutory orders and regulations, which put flesh

25 By way of parallel, section 3 of the CanadianBill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, R.S.C.

1970, Appendix III, provides that the federal Minister of Justice shall examine every proposed
regulation and every Bill in order to ascertain whether any provisions are inconsistent with the
Canadian Bill of Rights. For discussion of the implementation of this section, see W.S.
Tarnopolsky, The CanadianBill of Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975) at

125-28.
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on the bones of much modern legislation. Regulations often have
as much potential to affect basic rights as do their governing
statutes, and yet they usually escape effective legislative scrutiny. All
the more reason, then, that governments should set up mechanisms
to screen draft regulations for possible Charter violations. Such
mechanisms should allow for the possibility of effective public
representation so as to provide a broad and informed basis for
decision-making.
The duties of governments and legislatures include not only
the scrutiny of proposed legislation and regulations, but also the
review of laws on the books at the time the Charter took effect.
Interestingly, a number of governments have already taken this
responsibility to heart. To cite only one example, in 1984 the
government of Saskatchewan published a discussion paper which
singled out forty-five provincial laws as being in clear violation of
the Charter,2 6 and the following year it passed an omnibus bill
amending or repealing the laws in question.27 As recounted by Jim
MacPherson, who was then Director of the Constitutional Law
Branch for the Saskatchewan Ministry of Justice, "If, at any time
before that Act was passed, any of these laws had been
challenged
2
them."
defend
to
not
been
have
would
position
our
The same constitutional duties that bind a government in its
legislative functions also affect its strictly executive activities, in the
exercise of prerogative and statutory powers and generally in the
administration of the law.29 The implication is that governmental

26

Government of Saskatchewan Discussion Paper, Compliance of SaskatchewanLaws with

the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1984).
27 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Consequential Amendment Act, Bill
No. 41, 1984-5.
28 J.C. MacPherson, "Litigating Equality Rights," in Smith et al. eds, Righting the Balance:
Canada'sNew Equality Rights (1986), 231 at 235.

29 As Justice Dickson (as he then was) held in OperationDismantlev. The Queen (1985),
18 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.) at 491,

"...
the

executive branch of the Canadian Government

is duty bound to act in accordance with the dictates of the Charter," and this duty extended
to the federal Cabinet; see also ibid. at 485. In Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 at
518, La Forest J. held: "I'here can be no doubt that the actions undertaken by the

Government of Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject to scrutiny under the
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officials and administrative boards generally are obligated to observe
applicable Charter standards in carrying out their legal functions,
either because the law governing their powers must now be
interpreted in light of the Charter, or because the officials
themselves, as governmental agents, are directly bound by the
Charter's overriding provisions.30 We will look at this subject in
more detail later.
It is useful to pause here and consider the contrasting
position that the Judicial Model adopts on these matters. That
Model holds that the executive and legislative branches of
government have no duty to abide by Charter standards in
determining a course of action, even (it would seem) when courts
have already ruled that certain actions violate the Charter. For if a
government is not obligated by the Charter from the start, it is not
easy to see why court decisions should make it so. Thus the only
considerations governing a government's behaviour are prudential: a
cautious government will weigh the possibility of "being caught"
against any advantages to be gained by taking an unconstitutional
course of action. Even where it knows that a bill violates the
Charter,having been told so by its law officers, it might nevertheless
decide to introduce it into Parliament in the hope that its purposes
will be sufficiently served even if the legislation is eventually struck
down by the courts, given the time that may elapse before a final

Charter(s. 32)"; at 520-21, La Forest J. held that "[t]he pre-eminence of the Constitution must
be recognized; the treaty, the extradition hearing in this country and the exercise of the
executive discretion to surrender a fugitive must all conform to the requirements of the
Charter, including the principles of fundamental justice." Similarly in Jones v. The Queen
(1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 (S.C.C.), La Forest J.stated at 593: 'Those who administer the
province's educational requirements may not do so in a manner that unreasonably infringes
on the right of parents to teach their children in accordance with their religious convictions.
The interference must be demonstrably justified." See also the remarks of McIntyre J.in
Retail Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1986), 33
D.L.R. (4th) 174 at 195 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery].
30 This does not mean, of course, that such officials are bound by each and every Charter
provision, simply that they are bound by such provisions as actually apply to them, a matter
determined by the scope of each individual provision.
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judicial ruling is renderedY It need hardly be said that a
governmental attitude of this kind is at odds with the spirit of the
Charter and our constitutional traditions.
So far we have talked as if the duties imposed by the Charter
were largely negative, involving the exercise of restraint. But
governments and legislatures also have positive duties under the
Charter. To cite several obvious examples, the Canadian Parliament
and provincial legislatures are obliged to sit at least once every
twelve months; the statutes, records, and journals of the Parliament
of Canada and also the New Brunswick legislature must be
published in both English and French; and institutions of the same
two legislatures have a duty to communicate with members of the
public in both languages.3 2 The Charter also sets out extensive
governmental
responsibilities
regarding minority language
education.33
Beyond specific duties of this kind, governments and
legislatures have broad constitutional obligations to act affirmatively
in furtherance of certain Charterrights.34 The Charter'spotential to
promote beneficial governmental activity is well expressed by Justice
Lamer in his opinion in Mills v. The Queen 35 where he reflects on
the effects of section 11(b), which guarantees the right of an
accused person to be tried within a reasonable time:
Our legislators have, by the entrenchment of section 11(b), established as a

fundamental societal priority the maintenance of an effective and prompt system for

31 This is particularly true if courts will not issue an interlocutory injunction suspending

the operation of the legislation pending final determination of the question; see, on this point,
Attorney General of Manitoba v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110.
32 See sections 5, 18, and 20.

33 Section 23.
34 As Dickson CJ.C. has noted in a speculative way, there are "situations where the
absence of government intervention may in effect substantially impede the enjoyment of
fundamental freedoms (for example, regulations limiting the monopolization of the press may
be required to ensure freedom of expression and freedom of the press);" Re Public Service
Employee RelationsAct, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 361.
35 (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 234-35 (S.C.C.). Lamer . was dissenting, but not on
this point.
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There can be no assumption that the

constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time must conform to the status
quo; rather, it is the system for the administration of criminal justice which must
conform to the constitutional requirements of the Charter.

Thus, the section provides a mandate for affirmative measures by
both the executive and legislative branches:
In some areas of the country, delays in bringing accused to trial might well be
wholly unacceptable and significant efforts will be required to meet the test of

section 11(b). It may well be that the criminal justice system as a whole will have
to be accorded greater priority; it may also mean that within the criminal justice
system greater priority will need to be given to providing sufficient resources, both
human and financial, for the courts and the Crown offices.

But (to anticipate our next subject) executive bodies and legislatures
are not the only ones affected by the Charter.
Under section 11(b), the courts cannot simply admonish the executive or legislative
branches for failure to meet the requirements of the Charter, we must now look to
ourselves and determine whether the judiciary is adequately responding to the
demands of the Charter as well. Although all branches of government have a

measure of responsibility, the judiciary must play a central role in ensuring that the
right to be tried within a reasonable time is not frustrated by systemic delay.

Governmental obligations to act in furtherance of Charter
rights may exist regardless whether they can be effectively enforced
in a review court. It is a mistake, as pointed out earlier, to think
that the existence of a first-order constitutional duty depends on the
existence of a second-order power to enforce it. In such matters, a
review court might have, at most, the power to declare in general
terms that some such duty exists, without being able to order
compliance, thus leaving decisions as to the manner and extent of
implementation to the executive and legislature. But even the
complete absence of a declaratory power in the courts would, on
this view, not affect the existence of a first-order duty binding
governments.
The point being made here is that the Charter'spotential is
not limited to what may be accomplished through judicial action at
the review stage. Some may find it difficult to credit the existence
of governmental and legislative duties in the absence of a judicial
power to enforce them. Doubters should reflect again on the fact
that courts are commonly thought to be constitutionally accountable
for carrying out the Charter even though there may be no external
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body capable of holding them to their task. In the same way, it is
argued, governments and legislatures are constitutionally bound to
have regard to the values represented in the Chartereven when the
courts cannot directly compel them to do this. The point is crucial
to a proper understanding of notwithstanding clauses under section
33, as we will see later. But it also affects the overall way that we
conceive of the Charter.
The proposition that governments and legislatures are bound
to advert to Charter standards in their activities does not mean that
they have to proceed in the same manner as courts. We have to
banish the notion that the only proper mode of applying the Charter
is the judicial one, characterized by a slow and deliberate adversarial
process featuring arguments by the parties affected and a reasoned
decision. Such a process may be neither possible nor desirable in
the case of many governmental actors.
By the same token, to observe that an official need not
mimic a court when making a decision that affects Charter rights
does not entail that the official need not apply Charter standards.
To take an obvious case, police officers must take account of the
Charterguarantee against arbitrary detentions in deciding whether or
not to make an arrest 3 6 But this does not mean that they have to
entertain legal argument or give considered reasons before
proceeding, only that they should use their best judgement in the
matter, for the occasion may permit them time to do little more.
The example gives rise, however, to another question. How
can we realistically expect the ordinary police officer to apply
Charter standards in making arrests when the Charter provision in
question is worded so generally, speaking only of the "right not to
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned." How can the officer be
expected to know when an arrest is "arbitrary"? On one view the

police must await the development of authoritative standards by the
courts that indicate in greater detail the situations when arrests
violate the injunction against arbitrariness. This view has some
truth, because over time the courts will in fact develop a body of
jurisprudence governing the application of section 9 that will provide
some authoritative guidance to police officers in the performance

36 See section 9 of the Charter.
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of their duties. But to suggest that the courts alone are responsible
for the development of these standards seems wrong. First-order
actors usually possess a knowledge of the concrete situation that is
denied to the courts. They may thus be better placed than judges,
in some respects at least, to lay down workable standards governing
arrests. This reflection suggests that police officers should play an
active role in the formation of such standards.
How can they do this? A number of ways may be suggested.
Police departments and organizations, in consultation with relevant
governmental officials, should draw up guide-lines governing arrests
that in their view satisfy Charter standards and at the same time
allow the police to carry out their duties effectively. When the
Supreme Court comes to making decisions on these matters, it will
have the benefit of police thinking and experience - which it will,
of course, have to weigh along with other considerations.
What, then, is the role of the police once the Supreme
Court starts to build up a substantial body of precedents governing
the application of section 9 to arrests? Clearly it would be
irresponsible of the police to disregard these rulings and follow their
better judgement. But it would be equally wrong of the police to
remain completely passive in the face of rulings that they consider
misguided. Their job is to make use of judicial rulings to achieve a
workable application of Charter standards. In doing this they are
entitled to a certain leeway under the provisions of section 1, a
subject that we will examine later. The general point to be made
here is that the judiciary does not, by its own confession, have a
monopoly on the reasonable application of Charterstandards, all the
more so when they have little or no practical experience or special
expertise in the matter at hand.
B. Courts
What first-order obligations do courts have under the
Charter, apart from any second-order powers of review that they
possess? In what cases is a court directly bound by the Charter to
act in contexts where it is not concerned with judging the actions of
other first-order actors for conformity with the Charter?
There are several instances where the judiciary has pure firstorder functions under the Charter. The first is where a court is
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directly obliged by a particular Charter provision to act (or refrain
from acting) in a certain manner. A second instance arises when
a court, as part of its general obligation to apply the Charter, is
required to scrutinize a statutory provision enacted at a date before
the Charter took effect. A third occurs when a court is obliged to
modify common law rules so as to bring them into conformity with
the Charter. A fourth arises when a court carries on its normal
duties of interpreting enactments and applying them to concrete
situations. As we will see, the lines between these cases cannot be
firmly drawn in practice, but the scheme has the virtue of indicating
in a common-sense way the main areas of concern.
The first case is illustrated by section 13 of the Charter,
which specifies that witnesses who testify in any proceedings have
the right not to have their testimony used to incriminate them in
any other proceedings except in a prosecution for perjury or for the
giving of contradictory testimony. Under this section, a court has a
direct obligation to exclude testimony that would unjustifiably violate
this right.3 8 In the course of carrying out its first-order duty, a court
must determine what section 13 actually requires and what limits are
permissible under section 1. In the absence of statutory limitations
on the right (which is the case under consideration), the court will
have to determine whether any common law limits are reasonable
and justified. But the courts are themselves the authors of the
common law and possess a general power to remould and reform
it. It follows that courts may have to modify existing common law
restrictions on the right or impose new ones. In such cases the
judiciary is both author of these limits and judge of their compliance
with section 1, a proposition that is only superficially paradoxical.

37 I am excluding here the case where the court's decision to carry out its Charter duties

is affected by the existence of a statute passed after the Charter took effect. If a statutory
provision of the latter kind stands in the way of a court carrying out a prima facie duty under
the Charter, the court will necessarily embark on an enquiry as to whether the provision
conforms with the Charter, which is a second-order function. In such a case, as noted earlier,
the court's inquiry will have a mixed aspect, because the court will have to review the act of
a legislature (a second-order function) in the course of determining what its own first-order
duties under the Charter are.
38 See Dubois v. The Queen (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (S.C.C.), and R v. Mannion
(1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 712 (S.C.C.).
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What it means in practice is that, like legislatures, the courts have
the power39to impose reasonable limits on Charter rights in some
situations.
This brings us to the second case under consideration, where
the courts assess statutes passed in the pre-Charter era, or more
precisely, before the particular Charter provision in question came
into effect. 40 This activity resembles a second-order function since
it involves the review of provisions enacted by other bodies. On the
surface, of course, there may be little to distinguish a pre-Charter
statute from one passed after the Charter took effect. The essential
difference, for our purposes, is that in the first case the statute does
not represent the judgment of a body bound by the Charter at the
time of enactment, while in the second case it does. Since secondorder functions involve making decisions as to whether another body
was right in its application of Charterstandards, it can be seen that,
strictly speaking, this is impossible where the statute predates the
Charter. Rather, a court is simply deciding as a matter of abstract
principle whether the statute in question complies with the Charter.
The significance of this distinction will emerge below, where
it is argued that first-order judgments under the Charter may in
some contexts enjoy a degree of deference from bodies exercising
review functions. By contrast, where a court is reviewing an
enactment passed before the Chartertook effect, the enactment may
not be entitled to any special deference from the court. 41 As
MacKinnon, A.C.. remarked in response to an argument that a
certain statute should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality in
face of the Charter,"The supreme law was enacted long after the
39 Compare the approach of the Supreme Court in R v. Mannion, ibid at 720, where
McIntyre J.briefly considered the argument that a common law rule posed a reasonable limit

on a Charter right under section 13, and dismissed the argument on substantive grounds,
without coming to terms with the Court's role in generating the common law.
40 Section 15 of the Charter, it will be remembered, only took effect in 1985, three years
after the other Charter provisions.
41 As Justice Beetz explains in Attorney General of Manitoba v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 at 121-25, this result flows from the innovative character of the Charter
in relation to the existing legal system. However, with respect, the arguments advanced by
Justice Beetz in that case do not necessarily carry the same force with respect to statutes
passed after the Charter took effect.
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Juvenile Delinquents Act and there can be no presumption that the
legislators intended to act constitutionally in light of legislation
that
42
was not, at that time, a gleam in its progenitor's eye."
Nevertheless, the distinction between pre-Charter and postCharter legislation is not a hard and fast one. Many of the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter have long played a
significant role in our political and legal culture. It would clearly
be wrong to assume that pre-Charterlegislatures and governments
uniformly failed to give serious consideration to the impact of
legislation on basic human rights, for in some cases they clearly
did.43 In such instances, a court reviewing the statute in question
may effectively be exercising a second-order function, and the statute
may be entitled to the same degree of deference that post-Charter
legislation may enjoy.
Of equal interest is the courts' duty in relation to the
common law, which is our third case. The Coordinate Model argues
that the courts have a general constitutional obligation to develop
and apply the common law so that it conforms with the Charter,
even if their decisions cannot be reviewed by any other court or
body. This duty to develop the common law is not confined to rules
governing the operation of the executive and legislative branches or
the interaction of government and private individuals. It also
extends to the common law governing relations between private
parties.
The general point was accepted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Dolphin Deliveiy case, where Justice McIntyre states:
Where ... private party 'A' sues private party 'B' relying on the common law and

where no act of government is relied upon to support the action, the Charter will
not apply. I should make it clear, however, that this is a distinct issue from the
question whether the judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles of the

common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Constitution. The answer to this question must be in the affirmative. In this sense,
then, the Charter is far from irrelevant to private litigants whose disputes fall to be
decided at common law. But this is different from the proposition that one private
party owes a constitutional duty to another, which proposition underlies the

42 Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No. 1) (1983), 146 D.L.R. (3d) 408 at 420 (Ont.

C.A.).
43 For a striking example, see Edwards Books and Art Ltd v. The Queen (1986), 35
D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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purported 4assertion
of Charter causes of action or Charter defences between
4
individuals.

The Court holds, then, that while the Charter does not
directly bind private individuals, it mandates the courts to develop
the common law governing private relations so as to bring it into
reasonable conformity with Charter values. But it may be argued
that the mandate should be carried out with caution. Insofar as
many of the Charterrights and freedoms are mainly concerned with
upholding public values, the courts should be circumspect in
extending those values into areas that traditionally have been
preserves of personal autonomy. Ideally, they should proceed on a
case-by-case basis, gradually building up a body of jurisprudence,
rather than attempting to45lay down a priori principles governing
entire fields of endeavour.
The conclusion that courts have the duty to develop and
apply the common law in accordance with the Charterhas important
implications. Private individuals and groups owe a wide range of
duties to others either directly, under common law rules ordaining
the performance of certain actions, or indirectly under consensual
arrangements recognized and enforced at common law. If courts are
bound by the Charter in administering the common law in such
instances, private relations will be indirectly affected.
Take for example an instance where a landlord stipulates in
a lease that the tenant may not sublet the property to persons of a
certain race. A court asked to enforce this stipulation would have
to determine whether it can be countenanced at common law in
light of the Charter guarantee of racial equality under the law
(section 15). The court might well determine that the Charter

44 Supra, note 29 at 198. For critical appraisal of the Dolphin decision, see D. Beatty,
"Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority of Courts" (1987) 37 U.T.LJ. 183; P.W.
Hogg, 'The Dolphin Delivery Case: Application of the Charter to Private Action" (1987) 51
Sask. L. Rev. 273; and B. Slattery, "'he Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation: Does
Dolphin Deliver?" (1987) 32 McGill LJ. 905.

45 For a more extended argument to similar effect, see B. Slattery, "Charter of Rights
and Freedoms - Does It Bind Private Persons?" (1985) 63 C.B.R. 148, and the assessment of

this argument in J.D. Whyte, "Is the Private Sector Affected by the Charter?" in L. Smith et
al. eds, Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights (Saskatoon: Canadian Human
Rights Reporter, 1986) at 145-86.
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modifies the common law so as to invalidate contractual terms
purporting to bind parties to engage in racial discrimination. It may
be noted, however, that this conclusion does not in itself entail a
direct Charter duty on individuals not to discriminate; it simply
means that the common law will not enforce an agreement that
purports to oblige a party to discriminate. That is, on the view
espoused in Dolphin Delivery, the Charter instructs the courts to
withhold legal force from certain private arrangements; it does not
require people positively to do anything, or prevent them from
entering into non-binding arrangements.
Nevertheless, in other cases the Charter arguably imposes
indirect duties on individuals through the medium of the common
law. Take the example of a private employer who dismisses an
employee for supporting a particular political party. On a suit by
the employee for wrongful dismissal, a court might interpret the
common law in light of the value attached to freedom of expression
in section 2 of the Charter and the limits permitted in section 1 and
hold that the employer acted wrongfully. Such a decision would
entail that an employer is bound at law to respect the employee's
freedom of expression in certain contexts. It does not seem to
make much difference in practice whether we say that this obligation
flows from the common law (as interpreted in the light of the
Charter)or from the Charter itself (as moulded by the common law
under section 1); but in light of the ruling in Dolphin Delivery, it
would seem that the former way of expressing the matter is
preferable.
Finally, the courts have the duty to take the Charter into
account in interpreting ambiguous enactments and a companion duty
to apply even unambiguous provisions in a way that observes Charter
standards of reasonable respect for basic rights. In other words, a
court's responsibilities under the Charter do not cease once an
enactment has been brought over the threshold of Charter
compliance; they govern every aspect of a court's operations in
giving the enactment practical effect.
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IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN FIRST-ORDER AND SECONDORDER BODIES
The differing themes represented by the Judicial and
Coordinate Models run in deep currents beneath the surface of
many debates concerning the respective roles of legislatures and
courts under the Charter. I have chosen two areas where the
differences seem particularly striking: (1) reasonable limits on
Charter rights under section 1; and (2) the use of notwithstanding
clauses under section 33. It will not be possible to offer complete
accounts of these topics; each one would merit a paper to itself.
My object is simply to indicate the diverging lines of argument that
flow from the two models of the Charter,so as to give a better basis
for judging their relative merits.
A. Reasonable Limits on CharterRights
Section 1 provides that the Charterguarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it "subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." In what context should this provision be
understood? In particular, what are the respective roles of firstorder and second-order bodies in applying the standard laid down?
In considering this question, I will focus on the example of courts
acting in a review capacity with respect to laws enacted by
governments and legislatures. But the discussion can be extended,
with suitable modifications, to other sorts of contexts where secondorder actors assess the acts of others for conformity with the
Charter.
As seen earlier, the Judicial Model holds that courts alone
have the mandate to apply Charter standards and they alone are
competent to do so. Members of the executive and legislative
branches have no constitutional duty to take account of the Charter
in drafting and enacting legislation. Their only mandate is a nonlegal one: to further the interests of the citizenry as a whole or
particular groups within that body, or, on a more cynical view, to
maintain their own grip on power. They do not have to consider
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whether proposed legislation infringes Charterfights or whether such
an infringement can be justified under section 1.
It can be seen, then, that according to the Judicial Model
section 1 is directed exclusively at courts acting in a review capacity.
It provides them with a standard for assessing the legitimacy of
governmental acts that arguably interfere with Charter rights.4 6 So,
the section must be understood in the adversarial context that
characterizes most judicial proceedings, where one party argues that
a certain act violates the Charterand another party seeks to uphold
the act. In this context, section 1 can plausibly be read as imposing
on the party upholding the act the burden of justifying it. As

Dickson cJ.c. states in R. v. Oakes:
The onus of proving that a limit on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter
is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society rests upon
the party seeking to uphold the limitation. It is clear from the text of section 1
that limits on the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Charter are exceptions to
their general guarantee. The presumption is that the rights and freedoms are
guaranteed unless the party invoking section 1 can bring itself within the exceptional
criteria which justify their being limited. This is further substantiated by the use
of the word "demonstrable"
which clearly indicates the onus of justification is on the
47
party seeking to limit....

A second consequence of this viewpoint is that courts, in
reviewing a statute that arguably limits Charter rights in an
unjustified way, need not, and indeed should not, show any
deference to a governmental decision to pass the statute, even
where the decision has been made after the relevant Charter
provision came into effect. The reason is that, in principle, the
governmental decision is based on factors alien to those controlling
the court's assessment. For a court to show deference to such a
decision would be for it to relax the constitutional standards laid
46 See P.C. Weiler, "Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version'
(1984-85) 18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 51 at 61:
Experience has demonstrated that although in the abstract such fundamental rights
as freedom of speech may seem unabridgable, in practice they must be restricted
when they conflict with the rights of others or with the needs of the community.
In the Canadian context, the evolution of section 1 of the Charter clearly indicates
that the judiciary, not Parliament, is the institution responsible for drawing the line.

47 (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 at 225-26 (S.C.C.).
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down in the Charter in favour of "political" and other "non-legal"
factors and so doing to abdicate its particular responsibility to
protect basic rights from unwarranted governmental invasion. Even
where it can be shown that a government actually took into account
the relevant Charter standards in coming to its decision a court
would have no good reason to defer to that decision because a
government or legislature is (on this view) not equipped to apply
the standards in the proper way. In summary, according to the
Judicial Model, courts have a free hand to determine whether a
governmental act infringes a Charter right, and, where it does,
whether it can be justified under section 1.
This view of the Chartershould give us pause. It suggests in
effect that the judiciary is the only "principled" branch of
government, that legislatures and executive bodies have no mandate
to uphold the Constitution and so may be expected to violate it as
a matter of course. But our constitutional traditions run deeply in
another direction. Thus the division of powers between federal and
provincial legislatures in the Constitution Act, 1867 has never been
understood merely as a set of directives to courts to invalidate laws
that exceed the specified jurisdictional boundaries; rather it is
ordinarily understood as a code governing the conduct of the
executive and legislative branches, as well as the judiciary. This
basic understanding informs much of our reasoning about various
aspects of the Constitution. It underlies, for example, the following
statement of Justice Fauteux in Re Farm Products Marketing Act:
There is a presumptio juris as to the existence of the bona fide intention of a
legislative body to confine itself to its own sphere and a presumption of a similar
nature that general words in a statute are not intended
to extend its operation
48
beyond the territorial authority of the Legislature.

48 [1957] S.C.R. 198 at 255. This passage was quoted with approval by Ritchie J.in
Nova Scotia Boardof Censors v. McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662 at 687-88, where the opinion of

Strong J.in the early case of Severn v. The Queen (1878), 2 S.C.R. 70 was also cited as
authority. In the latter case, Strong J.stated at 103:
As this Court is now, for the first time, dealing with a question involving the
construction of that provision of the British North America Act which prescribes the
powers of the Provincial Legislatures, I do not consider it out of place to state a
general principle, which, in my opinion, should be applied in determining questions
relating to the constitutional validity of Provincial Statutes.

It is, I consider, our

duty to make every possible presumption in favour of such Legislative Acts, and to
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The presumption referred to here only makes sense on the
supposition that a Canadian legislature has a responsibility to respect
the constitutional limits imposed on its authority and that it normally
carries out this responsibility.
It is also worth remembering that, whatever wrongs our
governments have committed in the past (and I do not mean to
downplay them), it remains true that the measure of freedom,
equality, and social justice Canadians enjoy today is in no small part
the work of these bodies. Courts have not been the sole or even
principal custodians of basic rights in Canada. Much has been
accomplished through the normal democratic processes that
characterize the operation of our governmental and legislative
institutions.
Should these institutions now be treated as
constitutionally irresponsible under the Charter?
The Coordinate Model maintains that they should not. It
holds that the main responsibility for applying the Charter rests on
first-order actors, among which executive bodies and legislatures
figure prominently, along with the courts. These institutions have
the mandate to apply Charterstandards to their own conduct and to
ensure that, where that conduct stands to impinge on Charterrights,
it is reasonable and demonstrably justified under section 1. The
Coordinate Model views that section, then, as providing a standard
governing the conduct of first-order actors and holds that its
meaning can only be grasped in the institutional context of the
particular first-order actor in question.
Thus, for example, where a government is considering the
introduction of legislation that imposes stricter controls on the
distribution and sale of pornographic literature, it has the
constitutional duty to consider seriously the impact of any such
measure on freedom of expression and the extent to which it may
be justified in a free and democratic society. In this context, unlike
in a court, there are no well-defined "parties" opposing or upholding

endeavour to discover a construction of the British North America Act which will
enable us to attribute an impeached Statute to a due exercise of constitutional
authority, before taking upon ourselves to declare tha4 in assuming to pass it the
ProvincialLegislature usurped powers which did not legally belong to it..."
(emphasis
added).
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an already completed act or existing rule of law. It would be
artificial to try and determine who should bear the "burden of proof'
and quite unclear what the object of the burden might be. The
question confronting the government is whether any legislation
should be introduced at all, and if so, what shape it should take. At
this stage, the debate over the application of Charter standards is
necessarily fluid and takes place in a wide variety of contexts,
ranging from meetings of Cabinet to the silent ruminations of
governmental drafters.
So the requirement in section 1 that any limits on Charter
rights be reasonable and demonstrably justified relates, in this
context, to such matters as the seriousness with which a government
must regard the Charterright in question and the care it must take
in drafting any measures that limit that right. Where a government
carries out this mandate, it cannot necessarily be assumed that its
decision will be based on the wrong sort of factors or be intrinsically
flawed as "political" in nature. It would be equally wrong to view
the decision as irrelevant to what a court should hold when
reviewing the matter at second remove.
The view that section 1 is directed at first-order actors,
remarkably enough, has attracted the more recent support of Chief
Justice Dickson in Edwards Books and Art Ltd v. The Queen. In a
significant emendation of the Oakes holding, he writes:
In balancing the interests of retail employees to a holiday in common with their
family and friends against the section 2(a) interests of those affected the legislature
engaged in the process envisaged by section 1 of the Charter. A "reasonable limit" is
one which, having regard to the principles enunciated in Oakes, it was reasonable
for the Legislature to impose. The courts are not called upon to substitute judicial
opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise line....
The

exemption in section 3(4) of the Act under review in these appeals represents a
satisfactory effort of the part of the Legislature of Ontario to that end and is,
accordingly, permissible. 9

It is clear from this passage that section 1 is viewed as
applying primarily to the body responsible for making the decision
in the first instance (here the legislature) and only in a secondary
and derivative way to the court reviewing that decision. The Chief
Justice's statement is all the more significant given that the

49 (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 51 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
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legislation under review stemmed from the pre-Charter era.
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice was able to hold that the legislature
took into account the same sort of factors that it would have had to
consider under the Charter, that it did so properly, and that its
decision therefore merited the respect of the Court.
The Coordinate Model, then, throws significant new light on
section 1 and the roles of various constitutional bodies bound by the
Charter. But I do not mean to suggest that it results in only one
possible view of the relationship between legislatures and review
courts in the application of Charterstandards, namely that the latter
ought in all cases to be governed by a deferential attitude in their
dealings with the former. In fact, the merit of the Coordinate
Model is that it allows us to entertain a variety of differing models in
attempting to understand the respective roles of first-order and
second-order actors. I will outline several of these models and make
a few suggestions as to their possible relevance in the Charter
context without attempting to reach any final conclusions on the
matter. The first model imagines a situation where the first-order
actor has a duty to comply with the standards in question but also
plays a role which may lead the actor on occasion to ignore or
deliberately violate the standards in order to gain some advantage.
Thus, for example, a hockey player's desire to win the game may
tempt him to overlook certain rules if he thinks he can get away
with it. So the referee usually does not owe any deference to the
decisions of the first-order actors (that is, the players) and quite
properly substitutes his own judgment for theirs on questions of
rule-compliance. An inspector scrutinizing fish-canning factories for
conformity with governmental standards is probably in a similar
position, as is a criminal court judging citizen compliance with
certain criminal provisions. In cases of this kind, the second-order
actor performs the function of keeping the first-order actors in line,
or of resolving disputes as to whether or not they have broken the
rules, or of informing and educating them as to the proper
interpretation and application of the standards in question, or a
combination of these.
A second model, which is perhaps a variation on the first, is
exemplified by a court hearing an appeal from the rulings of a trial
court. Here the appeal court is under no obligation to defer to the
trial court's findings on the law, but it will normally show
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considerable deference to their findings of fact. The reason for the
latter is that the trial court is considered better placed to determine
the facts, as established by witnesses and other evidence. This is
not, however, the case with the law, and here appeal courts normally
feel free to substitute their own judgment for that of the trial judge
on the ground that they are better qualified to determine what the
law requires. Note that this second model differs from the first in
that the review power is not founded on the premise that the trial
court's role is such as to lead it to disregard or violate the standards
in question. This, of course, may happen on occasion, but it is not
built into the trial judge's role, as it clearly is with players engaged
in a game.
A third model is supplied by the relationship between courts
and administrative tribunals. In Canada, the courts have held that
the decisions of administrative bodies should generally only be
interfered with (in cases not involving excess of "threshold"
jurisdiction) where the decisions are patently unreasonable. ° Here
the deferential posture of the courts is based on such factors as "the
qualifications of the tribunal, the specialised nature of the area
regulated and, as in the case of the professions and the universities,
a history of self-regulation ...,"51 that is, generally, factors which
speak to relative institutional competence and, in the second case,
to the value of autonomous self-regulation. The latter factor should
not be under-estimated because it is common experience that overly
close supervision of first-order actors may lead to a sense of
frustration, a reluctance to take "risks," or a tendency to conceal or
disguise the true basis of decisions taken.
Which (if any) of these models is most apt to describe the
respective roles of legislatures and review courts under the Charter,
and more generally the relationship of first-order and second-order

50 See Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor

Corporation (1979), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417 at 424-25 (S.C.C.); Re Alberta Union of Provincial
Employees and Board of Governors of Olds College (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 7 (S.C.C.);
St. Luc Hospitalv. Lafrance (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 577 at 584-85 (S.C.C.); and the valuable

discussion in D. Mullan, "Judicial Deference to Administrative Decision-Making in the Age
of the Charter," supra, note 21.
51 D. Mullan, ibid, at 206.
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actors? The question cannot be fully treated here. But several
observations may be made.5 2
The issue of relative institutional competence is obviously
important, and it may point in different directions depending on the
subject-matter. In some instances, governments and legislatures may
be better-equipped than courts to determine and weigh the factors
germane to a finding of reasonableness under section 1 or indeed to
the interpretation and application of the substantive Chartersection.
Thus in Public Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen, Chief
Justice Dickson observes:
In my opinion, courts must exercise considerable caution when confronted with
difficult questions of economic policy. It is not our judicial role to assess the
effectiveness or wisdom of various government strategies for solving pressing
economic problems. The question how best to combat inflation has perplexed
economists for several generations.... A high degree of deference ought properly to
be accorded to the governments' choice of strategy in combatting this complex
problem.... The role of the judiciary in such situations lies primarily in ensuring that
the selected legislative strategy is fairly implemented with as little interference as
is reasonably possible with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.5 3

52 For further discussion, see M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A
Preliminary Inquiry," supra, note 18 at 154-59; P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,
supra, note 8 at 96-100; and D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: General Principles(Toronto:
Carswell, 1986) at 56-59.
53 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 at 442. In Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, La Forest J.
states at 523:
What has to be determined is whether or not, in the particular circumstances of the
case, surrender of a fugitive for a trial offends against the basic demands of justice.
In determining that issue, the courts must begin with the notion that the executive
must first have determined that the general system for the administration of justice
in the foreign country sufficiently corresponds to our concepts of justice to warrant
entering into the treaty in the first place, and must have recognized that it too has
a duty to ensure that its actions comply with constitutional standards. Blind judicial
deference to executive judgment cannot, of course, be expected. The courts have
the duty to uphold the Constitution. Nonetheless, this is an area where the
executive is likely to be far better informed than the courts, and where the courts
must be extremely circumspect so as to avoid interfering unduly in decisions that
involve the good faith and honour of this country in its relations with other states.
In a word, judicial intervention must be limited to cases of real substance.
See further, Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 at 559, La Forest 3.: "[A court] should
not lightly assume that the executive has ignored its undoubted duty to ensure that its actions
conform to constitutional requirements ..."; and United States v. Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564
(S.C.C.) at 572-73, La Forest J.
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In other instances, a review court may possess knowledge
and expertise equal or superior to that of the first-order body, and
so be in a stronger position to substitute its own assessment of the
Charter's requirements for that of original actor. Justice Lamer
54
singles out this factor in Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act,
where he holds that the principles of fundamental justice referred
to in section 7 of the Charter are to be found in the basic tenets of
our legal system: "They do not lie in the realm of general public
policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the
justice system."55 Within this domain, it may be inferred, a court
stands on relatively solid ground in scrutinizing a statute for
56
conformity with the Charter.
Other factors need to be taken into account.
A
governmental determination that a certain limitation is reasonable or
unreasonable does not bind the hands of future governments and
legislatures; mistakes can be remedied with relative ease, and
changes in public standards can be accommodated. By contrast,
even under a flexible doctrine of precedent, court decisions on these
matters may not be so easily reversed. So in areas where there is
the prospect of fairly rapid social change, it might be imprudent for
a court to attempt to describe in detail the correct configuration of
a breaking wave.
A third factor, which cuts the other way, is that the complex
roles played by governments and legislatures may in some cases lead
them to downplay or ignore Charter standards in the interest of
attaining other, ostensibly more pressing, goals. History suggests,
moreover, that governments are more susceptible than courts to the
shifting tides of public opinion, which cannot always be trusted to

54 Supra, note 7.
55 1Aid at 550.
56 See, nevertheless, Jones v. The Queen (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 at 598 (S.C.C.),
where La Forest 3. comments with reference to provincial obligations under section 7 of the
Charter 'he provinces must be given room to make choices regarding the type of
administrative structure that will suit their needs unless the use of such structure is in itself
so manifestly unfair, having regard to the decisions it is called upon to make, as to violate the
principles of fundamental justice."
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respect the rights of minority groups, particularly in times of crisis or

want.
These diverse reflections indicate that it would not be helpful
to try to formulate rigid principles defining in advance the
appropriate relations between second-order and first-order actors
under the Charter. While in some instances a posture of judicial
deference to governmental decisions may be justified, this need not
always be the case. By the same token, it would be wrong to
assume that courts should generally feel free to substitute their own
assessment of reasonableness for that of a legislature. In effect, I
think that the appropriate role of a review court can only be
determined on a case by case basis, in light of factors such as those
outlined above.
Judicial review of governmental decisions under the Charter
is affected by another matter that we have so far ignored: the
constitutional value of regional autonomy underlying the Canadian
federal system. The Confederation compromise rests on the premise
that decisions affecting many important sectors of activity are better
made by locally elected bodies than by a national Parliament. The
large degree of autonomy given to provincial bodies may be
supported on a number of grounds. Circumstances vary from region
to region, and so a uniform legislative response to a certain problem
may be less appropriate than responses individually tailored to each
region. Even assuming a basic similarity of circumstance, opinion
may differ from region to region as to the suitability of certain
measures. The value of a law cannot be measured strictly by its
intrinsic worth, apart from the question of how far those governed
by the law agree with it or have had the opportunity to contribute
to its formation. A federal constitution recognizes the value of local
citizen participation in the formation of governmental policies and
laws, by bringing important governmental institutions closer to local
communities and giving people greater opportunities to affect the
57
running of government

57 For discussion of this factor, see Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy,
Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada" in A. Cairns & C. Williams eds,
Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1985) at 183-229, esp. at 205-25.
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In any case, a measure that arguably is good for the country
as a whole or for a majority of its regions may have adverse effects
on particular provinces. In many sectors, our Constitution has opted
to prefer the provincial viewpoint to the national one and so
allowed local communities to prevent their own interests from being
swallowed up in global calculations. Federalism also enhances the
opportunities for social experimentation while minimizing the impact
of unsuccessful experiments by allowing new policies to be tested in
a single province before being adopted more broadly.
The Judicial Model has difficulty in taking proper account of
federalism. For it views the Charter as directed exclusively at the
courts, and the judicial system in Canada is a largely unitary one,
which does not reflect the federal principle to nearly the same
degree as our governmental and legislative arrangements. So, on
the Judicial Model, it would be natural to suppose that the Supreme
Court of Canada is ultimately responsible for the interpretation and
application of Charterstandards and that its decisions will, over time,
generate a jurisprudential code uniformly binding on courts across
Canada. In this scheme, it is not easy to see what role is left for
local input, and only too easy to imagine the effect of a uniform
body of Charter case-law on the autonomy of provincial institutions.
The Coordinate Model does not experience problems of this
kind. In viewing the Charter as directed primarily at first-order
actors, it routes much of the important decision-making under the
Charter through the existing structure of federal and provincial
governments and legislatures.58
They are the ones initially
responsible for the application of Charterstandards, and it is only to
be expected that their appreciation of the significance of those
standards, and in particular the reasonableness of limitations on
Charter rights, should differ. These differences of opinion are not

58 1 say "much," because it must be remembered that the Charter also binds courts in a
first-order way, in particular in the interpretation of the common law. In this field, there
would seem to be greater opportunity for the generation of uniform standards.
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only to be expected, under federalism they are to be welcomed and
respected5 9
It follows that courts, sitting in review on governmental
decisions under the Charter,should be prepared to accord significant
weight to the values implicit in federalism in reaching their decisions.
For although the Charter clearly limits the powers of the individual
governments created by the federal scheme, it does not alter the
scheme as such. The division of powers between federal and
provincial governments is as much a part of the Constitution as the
Charter. So the temptation to think that there can be only one
standard for Canada as to the nature of Charter rights and the
reasonableness of limits on them should be resisted.
The
Coordinate Model provides a strong structural basis for this
viewpoint.
B. The Use of Notwithstanding Clauses
Under section 33(1) of the Charter, a legislature may
expressly declare in an Act that the Act as a whole or some of its
provisions shall operate notwithstanding a provision found in sections
2 and 7-15. These sections contain some of the Charter's most
basic guarantees, including freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and equality
rights. Section 33(2) provides that where such a declaration is in
effect, the Act covered by the declaration "shall have such operation
as it would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in
the declaration." A declaration ceases to have effect five years after
it comes into force, or on some earlier date specified in the
declaration; but it is subject to reenactment. 60

59
As Justice LaForest observes in Edwards Books and Art Ltd v. The Queen, supra, note
49 at 72: "rhe simple fact is that what may work effectively in one province (or in a part of
it) may simply not work in another..."

60 Sections 33(3) and 33(4).
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The place of notwithstanding clauses in the overall scheme
of the Charter has been widely recognized as problematic.61 Part of
our difficulty in dealing with the matter is traceable to a failure to
distinguish clearly between several similar issues, which the
Coordinate Theory shows to be quite distinct.
The first and most fundamental issue is this: where a bill is
accompanied by a notwithstanding clause, is the enacting legislature
under any constitutional duty to ensure that the substance of the bill
complies with the Charterprovisions covered by the notwithstanding
clause? That is, does the presence of a notwithstanding clause
relieve a legislature of any duty it might otherwise have to scrutinize
the bill for conformity with the relevant Charterstandards?
The second issue focuses more narrowly on the legislative
decision to enact the notwithstanding clause proper, as distinguished
from the substance of the bill. Is a legislative decision to enact a
notwithstanding clause subject to any constitutional standards or
preconditions, other than the manner and form requirements set out
in section 33? Or is it free to enact such a clause on any grounds
and in any circumstances?
These initial issues, then, concern the first-order duties of
legislatures in using section 33. The remaining issues address the
second-order role of the courts. The third issue asks whether a
court may scrutinize a statute containing a valid notwithstanding
clause to determine if the statute's substance conforms with a
Charter provision covered by the clause. That is, does a valid
notwithstanding clause completely preclude a court from assessing
the statute's content under the relevant Charterstandards?
The fourth and final issue deals with a court's powers to
determine the validity of the notwithstanding clause proper. Can a
61 See generallyAlliancedes Professeursde Montrealv.Attorney-Gen era! of Quebec (1985),
21 D.L.R. (4th) 354 (Que.C.A.); D.J. Arbess, "Limitations on Legislative Override Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Matter of Balancing Values" (1983) 21 Osgoode
Hall LJ. 113; D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: General Principles,supra, note 52 at 12431; P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,supra, note 8 at 690-92; D. Greschner and K.
Norman, 'The Courts and Section 33," forthcoming in the Queen's Law Journal; S.A. Scott,
"Entrenchment by Executive Action: A Partial Solution to 'Legislative Override" (1982) 4 Sup.
Ct L. Rev. 303; B. Slattery, "Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Override Clauses
under Section 33 - Whether Subject to Judicial Review under Section 1" (1983) 61 C.B.R.
391; P.C. Weiler, 'Rights and Judges in a Democracy. A New Canadian Vision," supra, note
46 at 79-92.
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court ascertain if the legislative decision to enact the clause
conforms with any constitutional standards controlling that decision
(beyond the formal requirements of section 33)?
The Judicial Model yields a uniform set of negative answers
to these enquiries, which obviates any need to distinguish clearly
among them. Under this Model, at no time does a legislature have
any constitutional duties under the Charter. All that the Charter
does is to add a veneer of judicial review to the old constitutional
furniture. A fortiori, a legislature has no obligation to ensure that
a statute with a notwithstanding clause conforms with the Charter
provisions covered by the clause, and its decision to enact such a
clause is not controlled by any substantive (as opposed to formal)
constitutional standards.
Moreover, a notwithstanding clause
eliminates the possibility of judicial review. A court has no power
to review the content of legislation covered by a notwithstanding
clause in the relevant respect. Likewise, it probably has no ground
upon which to challenge a legislature's decision to enact such a
clause, so long as the procedures specified in section 33 have been
observed.
The startling conclusion is that the rights in sections 2 and
7-15 of the Charter are not actually constitutionally entrenched. 62
Their operation can be suspended by a statutory provision passed in
the normal manner, which can be reenacted indefinitely. Moreover
on this view, far from ensuring that certain fundamental rights are
not infringed, the Charter concedes that they can in fact be
infringed, and infringed unreasonably - a disquieting and paradoxical
proposition. Is it possible for a Charterof Rights and Freedoms to
recognize that fundamental rights may be suppressed without
reasonable grounds?
The Coordinate Model opens a way out of these difficulties.
In response to the first issue, it holds that a legislature is always
under a first-order duty to comply with Charterstandards in enacting
a statute, even when the statute contains a notwithstanding clause.
The effect of a valid notwithstanding clause is to curtail or eliminate
judicial review, not to release a legislature from its constitutional

62 For an argument to this effect, see A.F. Bayefsky, "The Judicial Function under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' (1987) 32 McGill L. J. 791 at 818.
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responsibilities under the Charter. So when a government drafts a
bill with a notwithstanding clause and a legislature considers it, they
both have the duty to ensure that in theirjudgment the bill does not
unjustifiably infringe any Charter rights, including those covered by
the notwithstanding clause.
It might be thought that the Coordinate Model allows for a
different sort of response to this issue. This maintains that,
although a legislature is normally duty-bound to observe the rights
guaranteed in sections 2 and 7-15 of the Charter,it can release itself
from this duty by enacting a notwithstanding clause. So when a bill
containing such a clause is introduced, the legislature has no
constitutional obligation to ensure that the bill's content complies
with the relevant Charter provisions. The basic difficulty with this
view is that a notwithstanding clause has no legal effect until it is
enacted. If a legislature ordinarily has a duty to comply with the
Charter,it is hard to see how a notwithstanding clause can remove
that duty. For the duty relates to the period before a statute's
enactment, yet the clause takes effect only on enactment. So the
clause's operation is confined to the subsequent period and can only
affect the review powers of courts.
In reply, it could be argued that a notwithstanding clause has
an absolving effect: it operates retroactively to relieve the enacting
legislature of its duty to observe Charter standards. A legislature
considering a bill containing a notwithstanding clause may justifiably
anticipate this result and ignore the Charter provisions covered by
the clause.
This argument, however, is weakened by the fact that a
notwithstanding clause's life is limited to five years. Put yourself in
the position of a legislature debating a bill that features such a
clause. The legislature knows that the clause will expire after five
years but the rest of the statute will remain in force indefinitely. It
also knows that the clause can be reenacted on expiry, but it has
no way of predicting whether that will happen, or whether it will
continue to happen every five years as long as the statute exists.
Given the possibility that the clause will ultimately be allowed to
expire, does the legislature now have a duty to ensure that the bill
conforms with Charter standards?
The question, I suggest, shows the flaw in the retroactive
view. On that view, so long as the notwithstanding clause remains
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in effect, the legislature will be retroactively relieved of its duty of
compliance. But if the clause is allowed to expire, under section
33(3) it will "cease to have effect." Insofar as the clause
retroactively frees the legislature of its constitutional duties, the
expiry of the clause will retroactively reinstate them. So on the
retroactive view, the legislature seems to be both bound and not
bound to take account of Charter standards in debating the bill,
which is of course impossible.
Nevertheless, it could be replied that the retroactive effect
of a notwithstanding clause operates once and for all. When a
clause takes force it retroactively relieves the enacting legislature of
its duty, and this effect outlives the expiry of the clause itself. This
interpretation seems inconsistent with the wording of section 33(3),
which rules out such lasting effects. But the argument has the merit
of inviting us to challenge its premises more directly.
The
fundamental objection to the retroactive view can be put simply. It
is unreasonable to maintain that the existence of constitutional
duties controlling a legislature's decision to pass a bill can depend
on whether or not the legislature decides to pass the bill. The
duties either exist at the time the bill is being considered or they do
not. They cannot retroactively be expunged by the performance of
the very act which the duties purportedly control.
These considerations suggest that, under the Coordinate
Model, governments and legislatures are always bound to ensure that
a bill does not impinge unreasonably on Charter rights, even where
the bill contains a notwithstanding clause. We will adopt this
premise in examining the remaining issues.
Turning now to the second issue, we must consider whether
legislative use of section 33 is controlled by standards other than the
formal ones specified in the section. It follows from what we have
just said that a legislature would violate its first-order duties in using
a clause to protect from judicial scrutiny an enactment that it
considered unjustifiable under the Charter. If a legislature is always
bound to respect Charter rights, as the Coordinate Model maintains,
it is likewise bound not to use a notwithstanding clause to assist an
unwarranted invasion of such rights. However this does not
necessarily mean that the decision to enact a notwithstanding clause
is subject to judicial review. That inference requires a separate (and
more contentious) chain of reasoning, which we will consider shortly.
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The duty not to use notwithstanding clauses to evade Charter
standards is the most obvious constraint on a legislature's resort to
section 33, but it is not necessarily the only one. Donna Greschner
and Ken Norman have argued, for example, that a notwithstanding
clause should only be employed in a remedial way, after legislation
has already been considered by the courts and struck down; it should
not be used preemptively, to block anticipated judicial review
altogether. 63 This argument draws its strength from the plausible
view that section 33 is intended to allow a further stage in the
dialogue between courts and legislatures as to the meaning of
Charter rights, not to prevent such dialogue altogether. The
argument merits full and serious consideration, which cannot be
given here.
In response to the third issue, which concerns the role of
courts faced with a notwithstanding clause, the Coordinate Model
agrees with the Judicial Model that a court cannot review legislation
containing a valid notwithstanding clause for conformity with a
Charter provision specified in the clause. While section 33 does not
diminish the first-order obligations of legislatures, it clearly has the
effect of allowing legislatures to hold in abeyance the review powers
of courts. So long as a notwithstanding clause is in effect, the
courts have no power to assess the statutory provisions that it
covers.
The broad outlines of the Coordinate Model view of section
33 now begin to emerge more clearly. That section should be
interpreted as empowering a legislature to shield statutes from
second-orderjudicial scrutiny, not as allowing it to escape from its
first-order Charter duties. It would be strange, for example, if
section 33 permitted Parliament to restore capital punishment
without considering whether this is an unjustifiably cruel and unusual
punishment. The true view is that a legislature cannot under any
circumstances put in place a punishment that it regards as unduly
cruel, or (more importantly) to enact one without regard to the
standards laid down in the Charter. Section 33 only permits a
legislature to insulate its judgment from judicial review for a period

63 Supra, note 61.
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of five years, with the possibility of renewal.64 On this view, section
33 empowers a legislature to convert itself into a High Court of
Parliament, with final word on the application of certain Charter
provisions for a time. It does not give a legislature the mandate to
ignore fundamental rights or to limit them unreasonably.
The most contentious point is that raised by the final issue.
May a court review a legislative decision to invoke a notwithstanding
clause and, in appropriate instances, declare the clause invalid, on
grounds other than failure to meet the formal requirements of
section 33?
It may be noted first that if one accepts the Greschner and
Norman argument that a notwithstanding clause can only be used in
response to a judicial ruling, it follows plausibly (if not necessarily)
that a clause deployed in violation of this rule can be declared null
by a court. Such a requirement, however, can be viewed as basically
formal in nature. Here we are asking whether there are any
substantive limits on the use of section 33 that a court may enforce.
We saw above that a legislature using a notwithstanding
clause has the duty to ensure that the measure protected by the
clause does not unjustifiably limit Charterrights. Given this premise,
it seems at least arguable that where a statutory provision shielded
by a nothwithstanding clause infringes the relevant Charterprovision
in a manner that on no possible reasonable view of the relevant
factors could be justified in a free and democratic society, a court
has the power to strike down the notwithstanding clause as itself
unreasonable under section 1 of the Charter. In such a case a
legislature would be employing a notwithstanding clause, not to
protect its own reading of the Charterfrom judicial second-guessing,
but to evade its duty to comply with the Charteraltogether. Where
this fact would be plain to any reasonable person studying the
statute in light of the background materials, I think that a court
might well be justified in refusing to countenance a legislative use of

64 Subject to the arguments considered below about outside limits on the use of
notwithstanding clauses.
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section 33.65 It must be conceded, however, that the Coordinate
Model does not necessarily lead to this conclusion, and indeed
allows for quite different views.
It is also worth noting that a similar conclusion can be
reached by another route. Under the terms of section 33, a
legislature cannot enact a notwithstanding clause affecting the
"Democratic Rights" embodied in sections 3-5 of the Charter,which
include in particular the right to vote. So a provision protected by
a notwithstanding clause can always be challenged for unreasonably
limiting those rights. But it can be argued that the Democratic
Rights have the collective effect of guaranteeing the essential
preconditions of a free and democratic society. So, for example, the
right to vote in section 3 presupposes the existence of conditions
which render that right meaningful, such as the freedom to discuss
openly basic social and political issues, the freedom to criticize the
government and its policies, the freedom to assemble to listen to
speakers on these topics, the freedom to associate with others in
various political parties and interest groups, the freedom to mount
66
candidates for political office, and so on.
More generally, it can be pointed out that the universal
character of the right to vote is premissed on the recognition of the
right of every citizen to equal respect. On this view, any measures
that deny that right in such a fundamental way as to render the
universality of voting rights meaningless or incomprehensible are
open to judicial review, even where they do not directly deny the
right to vote. For example, a measure that confined the members
of a minority racial group to separate and inferior educational
facilites could arguably be struck down for denial of the right to
equal respect underlying section 3, even if the measure were

65 For a detailed argument supporting this view, see B. Slattery, "Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms - Override Clauses under Section 33 - Whether Subject to Judicial
Review under Section 1," supra, note 61.
66 See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985), 18 D.L.R. 321 (S.C.C.), where Dickson J.,

discussing the purpose of the Charter guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion in
section 2(a), states at 361: %..an emphasis on individual conscience and individual judgment
also lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition. The ability of each citizen to make

free and informed decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability, and
efficacy of our system of self-government"
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protected by a notwithstanding clause excluding the application of
sections 2 and 7-15. The reason is that any justification for the
segregation measure in question must in the end deny the basic
rationale for a universal right to vote.
These arguments for enforceable limits on the use of section
33 must not, however, be exaggerated or misunderstood as a covert
attempt to read the section out of the Charter. To the contrary,
they are designed to identify a legitimate sphere for the use of
notwithstanding clauses while preserving the Charter's integrity.
Instances in which a court would be justified in nullifying a
notwithstanding clause on substantive grounds will likely be few and
confined to cases where the legislative measures are so extreme that
they cannot be reconciled on any reasonable view with the basic
democratic values animating the Charter as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
The approach that I have taken to the Charter differs in
several ways from current orthodoxy. One difference deserves
particular emphasis. The approach is concerned as much with
constitutional duties as it is with constitutional rights. Rather than
asking simply what rights exist under the Charter and how they can
be enforced, I have asked what persons and bodies are bound by
the Charter and what their duties involve. These two lines of
inquiry are in fact complimentary; a balanced view of the Charter
would draw on both. I have emphasized the second one here
because it best brings out the complexity and richness of the Charter
and has been unjustly neglected.
Adopted in isolation, the rights-based approach results in a
view of the Charter that is excessively individualistic and courtoriented and ignores the positive roles to be played by legislatures,
governments, and society at large.
In concentrating on the
recipients of rights, this approach observes that most Charter rights
are conferred on individuals and that where such rights are violated
they are most readily enforced in the courts. Moreover, on the
standard view, the courts can only enforce the Charter as against
governmental agents as representatives of society. The Charter,
then, is portrayed as a document giving individuals rights that are
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enforceable in courts against society. Governments and legislatures
are the potential villains of the piece, and individual rights are pitted
directly against the broader social and political considerations
underlying governmental action. Judges are presented as the
ultimate mediators and potential saviours, with a mandate to uphold
individual claims against threatening social forces.
This picture distorts the true character and operation of the
Charter. To restore a proper balance we have to shift our focus
from individuals and their rights to the question of what bodies are
bound to respect and implement Charter rights and what their
responsibilities entail. Legislatures and governments, along with the
courts, have first-order duties under the Charter, and in some cases
private individuals may also have what amount to first-order duties
through the mediation of the common law. These duties take a
variety of forms. In many instances they do not simply entail
respecting Chatter rights in the negative sense of not interfering with
their exercise. The duties also entail maintaining and strengthening
the conditions essential for a meaningful exercise of the rights.67 All
this involves making practical judgments as to how far Charterrights
may justifiably be limited in light of other values - many of which
are not directly represented in the Charter.
Thus in the case of statutes, it is for governments and
legislatures to decide initially how Charter rights can best be
implemented and supported and what sort of limits may rightly be
imposed on them under section 1. Considerations going to the
common good thus operate at an early stage to mold the rights of
individuals as they are actually held in practice. Courts are, of
course, entrusted with a review function in relation to legislative
decisions affecting Charter rights. But in this context their role can
at best be secondary and somewhat peripheral. Their impact is felt
in only a minority of instances, and normally it operates in a
negative manner. Pruning is no substitute for growth.
Legislatures and governments are not the only actors with
first-order duties under the Charter. As we have seen, the courts
have a direct responsibility to develop and apply the common law in
67 For a persuasive exposition of the view that basic individual freedoms can only be

realized under certain social conditions, see Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in Philosophy and the
Human Sciences (1985) at 187-210.
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a manner consistent with basic Charter values. Large parts of our
ordinary lives are regulated by the common law,68 and here the
courts have a role roughly similar to that played by legislatures in
passing and amending statutes. Judges must decide how the
common law can best be developed to reflect Charter values and
also what limits can justifiably be imposed in the common good.
Here again, social considerations should play a large part in molding
judicial deliberations.
In short, the Charter is a mandate for principled action in
furtherance of fundamental rights and the common good. The cast
of actors includes not only the courts, but also legislatures and
governments. The rights actually held by individuals under the
Charter are to be determined by the joint action of these bodies,
which should take place in a context where the larger interests of
society figure prominently. That is, individual rights can only be
constituted in practice by bodies that act on behalf of society at
large.

68 In all Provinces save Quebec, where the Civil Code of Lower Canada (1866), a
statutory creation, plays an equivalent role.

